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Abstract
Due to progress in statistical methods and improved data processing capabilities, count data
modelling has become increasingly popular in the social sciences. In empirical international
relations and international conflict research, however, the use of event count models has been
largely restricted to the application of the simple Poisson approach so far. This article outlines
the methodological weaknesses of the model and presents some improvements which are applied
to the problem of international interventionism. The cross-sectional data set used covers the
behaviour of states during the period from 1970 to 1989, and thus avoids some theoretical
problems of the standard long-term dyadic approach. The main result of the analysis is the
empirical irrelevance of idealist conceptions claiming pacifying effects of democratization or
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11. Introduction
The question of how to reduce the use of military force between countries is one core problem
of the discipline of international relations. After the obvious failure of installation of universal
democratic peace following the collapse of the Cold War system, and with the renaissance of
military violence or threat as a valuable instrument for the pursuit of national interest (e.g. in the
Balkans, in the former Soviet Union or in East Asia), it is as topical as ever. In order to identify
factors making for war or peace, a vast amount of empirical work has been done so far in order
to test the immense stock of theoretical literature and arguments forwarded on the topic (e.g.
Singer 1979). Recent surveys of the issue, e.g. of democracies being more peaceful than other
political systems, include Russett (1993) and Rummel (1995). A broader approach investigating
the empirical validity of idealist theory of international affairs has been chosen by Bremer (1992),
for example, which also serves as a methodological benchmark to us.
The basic problems with most empirical work in the field of war and peace so far can be summed
up in four points. First, researchers often look at long periods of history, often covering more
than a century, without taking into account possible changes in the technological, economic and
political framework of the international system. For example, there seems to be a significant
qualitative difference of a state waging war in the multipolar system of European pentarchy of
the 19th century and with the limited military technology of the time, and one acting under
bipolar nuclear MAD and with availability of modern conventional weaponry. Not taking into
account the resulting fundamental differences in conditions of decision-making would possibly
lead to doubtful empirical results.
Second, more often than not, a dyadic approach is chosen, building on data sets consisting of all
combinations of theoretically possible antagonists in the international area. While this approach
provides a great number of observations, which is important from a statistical point of view, it
only enables identification of factors increasing the likelihood of international conflict without
looking at the crucial point of which state is the aggressor in it. If one aims at providing empirical
support to the scientific search for decreasing the occurence of war, one should concentrate on
the special characteristics of countries starting military confrontations. 
2A third point which is closely related to this is the definition of international conflict on which
data collection is based. Restricting analysis to incidents equalling the notion of "war" in
international law is not adequate when actual use of military force in international relations is
aimed at. Actions like "invited interventions" which do not fit the legal term of "war" must also
be taken into account. 
Finally, the very methods used in empirical work in international relations are often inadequate
for the data situation and tend to ignore fundamental statistical problems by relying on traditional
approaches inadequate for more complex empirical questions. We will discuss this for the case
of event count data accounting for a great number of typical data situations in international
affairs and conflict analysis.        
This paper wishes to avoid those problems by choosing the following approach: We look at a
limited period of time in order to identify factors fostering the use of violence in international
relations given a stable overall framework of the international system. Section 2 of the paper
provides the theoretical background of the hypotheses to be tested. Part 3 presents the data set
which concentrates on the characteristics of individual interventionist and non-interventionist
countries instead of dyads. Interventions include all kinds of distinct military operations,
notwithstanding their formal legal aspect. For a statistically appropriate analysis of the data, we
use several count data models which are relatively new and seldomly used in international
relations. The methods applied are introduced in section 4. Part 5 presents the empirical results
and compares them to the implications of theory. Part 6 concludes.      
2. Theoretical Hypotheses
The theoretical aspects of the resort to the organized use of force in international relations are
well covered and broadly discussed in the literature. Bremer (1992) gives an adequate overview
of theoretical predictions about the occurence of interstate military conflict and some empirical
evidence. The general pattern in the literature indicates that the likelihood of interstate war
decreases with e.g. geographical distance, inequality in power or spread of democracy. Since our
main object are methodology and some basic theoretical issues, we can concentrate on the
theoretical background of the hypotheses to be tested here. In brief, we look for evidence for
four traditionally mentioned elements in a state's behaviour vis-à-vis the use of military force: its
3actual position as a military power, the character of its political system, its economic
performance, and its degree of militarization. 
First hypothesis: Great powers are more likely to use military force in pursuing their foreign
policy interests than smaller states.
This claim is based on the assumption that the status of being a great power depends on being
able to impose one's will onto another by force:
 "It can be quite convincingly argued that major powers achieve and maintain their status
as such because, in large measure, they pursue an active, interventionist, perhaps even
aggressive, foreign policy that brings them more frequently into violent conflict with
other states" (Bremer 1992, p.314).
Moreover, it seems obvious that there are strong incentives for economically, militarily and
demographically superior countries to use their power against weaker states since the risk of
failure seems relatively low. Military force is thus a normal political instrument for a great power,
and its actual use is more a question of practicability than of principle (Maurer and Porth 1984).
Second hypothesis: Democratic systems tend to avoid offensive military operations as part of
their foreign policy.
The argument of the peaceful character of democracies is one of the most common ones in
international relations and in practical policy (e.g. Russett 1993, Garfinkel 1994). The basic idea
behind it can already be found in the works of Machiavelli (1965) or Kant (1964) who hint at the
unwillingness of peoples to accept the personal costs of war, which becomes relevant for political
decision-makers as soon as they are dependent on the votes of the people. Moreover,
democracies being open societies in Kant's view should also be prepared to accept the rules of
peaceful international interaction under international law (Archibugi 1995). Nevertheless, unless
the democratic procedure requires a referendum for declaration of war, there may be incentives
for politicians to wage war in order to use the "rally-round-the-flag" effect for being reelected
(Hess and Orphanides 1995). This may be the reason why actual empirical evidence for the
widely held theoretical belief in democratic peace is ambiguous (Chan 1984, Weede 1984,
Bremer 1992, Russett 1993). 
Third hypothesis: Militarized states are prepared to take military options and therefore tend to
be more aggressive.
On the one hand relatively high expenses of national resources in armaments can be interpreted
4as preparation for war or any actual use of military force (Mansfield 1992). On the other hand
they may well be an indicator for the character of a society being generally ready for use of force
in domestic as well as in foreign affairs. Even if militarization is an expression of some kind of
defensive deterrence doctrine, it can result in arms races with the potential opponents leading to
destabilization and, finally, to war (Angell 1910).  
Fourth hypothesis: Economic wealth decreases preparedness to use military force. 
If military aggression and war are seen as risky business, a country having reached a high level of
material wealth will be reluctant to gamble on the basics of this wealth by endangering them by
a war. This is especially relevant if economic development and prosperity depend on international
interaction and interdependence in trade and finance. The "merchant's spirit" coinciding with
economic development should then reinforce Kant's point on democracy:  The relative decline of
potential gains by successful aggression decreases incentives as well as possibilities of realization
of violent foreign policy, due to domestic resistance. An opposite view that has been reforwarded
recently, however, insists on the structural conditions of capitalist economic development being
closely related to or even dependent on the existence of war in the international system (Wolf
1995).        
3. The Data Set 
The data set used here to test for those hypotheses covers the intervention behaviour of 110
states between 1970 and 1989. There were several reasons for selecting this period: First, the
international system after the conclusion of most decolonization wars and after installation of
military parity between the U.S. and the USSR, and before the collapse of the socialist regimes
in Eastern Europe was a relatively stable one. Exogenous nuisance of behaviour is thus
minimized. Second, for this short period of time, it was possible to identify clearly nuclear
powers as well as democracies. Moreover, interventions like the Six-Days-War in 1967 and the
invasion of Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia 1968 with their problematic distinction of
formal and material aggressors (Israeli preventive strike and Warsaw Pact members' solidarity
enforced by the USSR, respectively) could be excluded. 
Each of the 110 states was characterized by a set of variables representing its use of military
force abroad, political system, economic performance and degree of militarization during the
5sample period. These variables are:
- the number of interventions observed,
- the average share in world population during the period (in %),
- the average relative military strength in % of world military manpower (only regular
forces, excluding reserves and police),
- the average share in world output in % of world GNP,
- a dummy for nuclear power status (1 for nuclear power, 0 else),
- a dummy for the political system (1 for democracy, 0 else),
- the average share of military expenditure in % of GNP, and
- the average number of soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants.
In addition, we defined a simple indicator for the country's wealth, the average quotient of the
share in world output and the share in world population. Distributional aspects of national
income notwithstanding, the higher the quotient the higher the per capita living standard of a
country should be.
The values of the variables were calculated from data from the "Military Balance" and from
Gruber (1990). We preferred using relative numbers in order to avoid problems with inflation
and changing base years in the indexation of US-$ numbers. In identifiying military interventions,
we used the definition by Hammarström (1986, p.13): 
"(...) a military intervention will be considered to have taken place when the government
of one country authorizes military personnel to undertake an operation within the borders
of another country. (...) 'Military personnel' signifies persons conscripted or employed for
the purpose of taking part in combat. This implies that mercenary troops are included,
but 'military advisors' are not included unless they are also combatants. A military
'operation' is defined as any movement made in carrying out strategic military plans (...).
More specifically, such a movement must involve combat".
Military operations within the framework of the United Nations, like the Lebanon "intervention"
in 1983 were excluded since they cannot be taken as an indicator for preparedness for violent
foreign policy. Following Bremer (1992), we distinguish between appearance and duration of an
intervention. A military operation is therefore counted as an intervention only if it means a start
or a clear escalation of use of military force. For example, Israeli offensives into Lebanon 1978
and 1982 were counted as two separate interventions, while the permanent guerilla war between
Israel and Palestinians based in Lebanon was not included. Spector (1988) provided information
6(1)
(2)
about nuclear powers. Finally, the basic criterion for a country being defined as a democracy,
was existence of a government which was effectively controlled by a parlament created by free
elections (Sartori 1987) for at least 15 of the 20 years observed. 
The data show the following patterns: 31 of the 110 states were democracies, 79 had a different
political system, i.e. in principle a socialist regime or a military dictatorship. There were seven
nuclear powers during the period observed: the US, the USSR, Great Britain, France and China,
being official possessors of nuclear weapons, Israel (since the end of the sixties) and India (since
1974). South Africa, Pakistan and Iraq were threshold powers without having nuclear weapons
available (at least for most of the time between 1970 and 1989) and were thus counted as
non-nuclear states. 30 countries intervened 68 times in other states (Table 1). Most frequent
interventions were made by the US (6) and France (5). Descriptive statistics show that the means
of the population, military strength, GNP, military expenditure and militarization variables are
clearly higher for the interventionists than for the non-interventionists (Table 2).     
4. Count Data Modelling 
The use of count data models in estimating the relationship between a discrete, non-negative
exogenous variable y and a vector of explanatory endogenous variables x  has become a commoni
procedure in most social sciences in recent years. Based on the problems arising from inadequate
assumptions of the ordinary least squares estimation concerning event counts (King 1988), King
(1989a) has introduced count data models into international relations. 
The standard model for count data is the simple Poisson model with the probability distribution
and
7(3)
x  is the vector of observed covariates and   is a vector of coefficients. The exponential formi
ensures  to be strictly positive. The assumption of a Poisson process as a rule for the underlying
occurence generation especially in the case of international conflicts is supported by Houwling
and Kuné (1984). Recent applications of the Poisson model in international conflict analysis have
been Bremer (1992) and Kinsella and Tillema (1995). 
Although it avoids basic weaknesses of the OLS model with count data, the Poisson model itself,
however, may be not the best choice. The problems of the Poisson model have been largely
discussed in econometric literature (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi 1986). The two most important
failures of the simple Poisson approach are the assumption that the underlying stochastic process
is a deterministic function of the covariates alone, and that events occur randomly over time.
Thus unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. the possibility of missing exogenous variables, which seems
unavoidable in complex foreign policy decision issues, is excluded. Moreover, no influence of
occurences on the probability of future events is allowed for. International interventions,
however, representing military commitment of a country abroad, may well be dependent on each
other, e.g. by the perceived necessity to repair failures of previously not totally successful
operations (Israel - Lebanon 1978 and 1982), or by being expression of a broader strategy
seeking to establish some regional hegemonic regime (India - Sri Lanka 1987 and India -
Maledives 1988).   
Both problems lead to a violation of the basic Poisson assumption that variance equals mean. If
there exists extra-Poisson variation or if present and future occurences are positively related,
overdispersion results with the variance exceeding the mean, leading to overestimation of
parameter significance. In order to overcome those problems, more sophisticated models have
been developed. For an overview of recent progress see Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1995).
One way to allow for additional variation is using compound Poisson models which introduce an
additional error term into the simple Poisson framework:
u  then captures unobserved heterogeneity and is assumed to be uncorrelated with thei
explanatory variables. Since u  follows a probability distribution on its own, the distribution of yi
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is now a mixture distribution. If u  is gamma distributed with ( ,  ) then y  follows a negativei i i i
binomial distribution with
Cameron and Trivedi (1986) denote a special negative binomial model as NEGBIN II which
nests the standard Poisson model. They introduce an overdispersion parameter   and let = .i i -1
In addition, a nonlinearity parameter k has to be assumed a priori. Generalizations of the negative
binomial model have been proposed by King (1989b) and Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1991).
The generalized event count model GEC  of Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1991) nests thek
Poisson and the NEGBIN models, and gives efficient estimates and correct asymptotic standard
errors for all parameters including k and  . The generalized variance function is thus: 2
If  <1 the variance is smaller than the mean, and the model takes account of underdispersion ini 
the data, while  >1 models overdispersion.i 
A third problem of the simple Poisson approach not covered by those models is the possible
systematic difference between the occurence of zero or more than zero events. The importance
of this weakness of the Poisson model is demonstrated by King (1989a) who presents a Poisson
estimation indicating that an increase in international organization by military alliances rises the
risk of a state being involved in a war. This is contrary to the statement of conventional theory
claiming that alliances are mainly formed for defensive purposes, i.e. to prevent war by
deterrence. In order to capture this problem, a hurdle Poisson model is used. It combines a
dichotomous model determining the binary outcome of the count being zero or positive with a
truncated-at-zero Poisson model for strictly positive occurences. The probability distribution of
the hurdle model is given by
9(6)
(7)
and
f and f  are any probability distribution functions for non-negative integers governing the hurdle1 2
part and the process once the hurdle has been passed, respectively. In the example by King
(1989a), the use of the hurdle approach leads to empirical results which are more consistent with
theory: While the existence of alliances has no effect on the occurence of war, once a war has
started in the international system, it increases the likelihood of the states being involved in it.
Here, we apply two Poisson distributions with   = exp(x  ) and   = exp(x  ). All models are1 1 2 2
estimated using the standard maximum-likelihood technique. 
Apart from King (1989a) and Martin (1992), for example, those models have rarely been used in
international relations so far. We therefore use the range of count data models for the analysis of
the characteristics of interventionist countries not only to evaluate the actual relevance of
traditional theory, but also to propagate employing of those techniques in empirical work in
international relations.    
5. Estimation Results
We successively estimate a Poisson, a GEC  and a hurdle Poisson model and compare theirk
performance by using a standard likelihood ratio test for the nested Poisson and GEC  models,k
and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the one-step and the hurdle models. From our
theoretical considerations, we expect all variables to be significant with the great power
(population, military personnel, GNP and nuclear status) and the militarization indicators
(defense budget and soldiers in population) having a positive sign, i.e. increasing the number of
interventions, and the coefficients of the variables wealth and democracy being negative.
The estimation results for the Poisson and the GEC  models fit theory only in parts (Table 3).k
While population, military personnel, GNP, nuclear power and defense expenditures are
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significant in the Poisson framework, democracy, militarization of the population and wealth
have no statistically significant influence on the number of interventions realized by a country.
Moreover, the coefficient of military personnel is negative. The GEC  model confirms thosek
results except for the nuclear power and the soldiers in population variables. Here, nuclear
power has no influence while military mobilization of the population significantly increases the
number of interventions. According to a likelihood ratio test with a critical ²-value of 3.84 on
the 95%-level, the more flexible GEC  model is of higher explanatory power than the Poissonk
model. However, the estimated values of ² (not being significantly different from 1) and k
indicate that there is no overdispersion in the data, which is why a NEGBIN approach (where
k=1) is not sensible here. The results to look at are therefore those of the GEC  model.k
The one-step approach thus leads to the following conclusions: First, population and GNP, being
indicators for a country's power status, have a significantly positive influence on the number of
interventions. Negative significance of military personnel and insignificance of availability of
nuclear weapons may indicate that military power is not adequately modelled by using the
quantitative strength of an army without taking into account its status in equipment and training,
while nuclear weapons as purely defensive instruments of deterrence play no role in conventional
military operations.. The use or even any implicit recurrence on nuclear arms is ruled out due to
reasons of inapplicability of this kind of weapons, including international public opinion, internal
moral restraints (limiting justification of nuclear strikes to questions of actual national survival)
and tactical inefficiency.
Equipment may be partly covered by the significance of defense expenditure. The main
implication of the defense budget variable, however, is that military forces are prepared in order
to be actually applied as a means of foreign policy. The positive effect on interventionism is
independent of the degree of manpower available. Again, practical constraints on intervention
operations hint at the need of small but highly qualified (and expensive) forces while mass armies
may be employed only in strategically defensive action. Thus negative significance of the military
personnel variable may also result from some kind of conventional deterrence representing a
defensive, non-interventionist attitude in the direct presence of some perceived external threat.
Nevertheless, a high relative number of soldiers in a society may be interpreted as a manifestation
of some militarist ideology resulting in higher preparedness for military intervention.   
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Most interestingly, the political system is clearly insignificant in both estimations: Democracies,
contrary to general belief, do not behave differently from other states as far as the use of military
force in pursuit of national goals is concerned. The same is true with economic performance:
Being wealthy does not imply abstention from active application of military violence. 
In order to take account of the possible systematic difference between a country's principal
decision to intervene at all, and how often to do this, we also estimated a hurdle Poisson model
analogous to the one used by King (1989a). Its results (Table 4) confirm our interpretation of the
defense budget variable since expenditure for military purposes is positively significant only in
the first step of the regression. GNP is significant (on the 90%-level) only in the second step of
the decision-making process on intervention. This seems sensible if the actual number of military
actions is at least partly determined by economic power representing overall military potential,
too. The military personnel variable is significant and has a negative sign, again hinting at some
problem with equalling military power with the number of soldiers available. All other variables
are insignificant in both steps of the regression. Contrary to the one-step approach, population
and soldiers in population thus do not play any role if a two-step process is assumed underlying
political and military decision-making on interventionism. Looking at the performance of the
hurdle model by using the AIC for non-nested models in order to compare it to the two one-step
estimations, one finds that the simple Poisson model fares a bit worse, while the GEC  model isk
slightly better. The qualitative differences between the models, however, are not too striking.
Assuming a separation between the basic decision to intervene and the one on the actual number
of interventions seems therefore somewhat doubtful. Interventions being a crucial issue in foreign
policy, gambling with soldiers' lives and valuable military resources may well require some kind
of fundamental decision-making in each single case.     
6. Conclusions
Summarizing the basic results of the estimations, one can state that at least two of the claims of
traditional theory have to be rejected if tested in international interventionism. Neither economic
wealth nor democratic political structures imply per se less use of force in international affairs.
While democracies may not fight each other, they are ready to recur on military violence in an
international environment with political systems of all sorts. Classical elements of great power
definitions like population and especially GNP show that bigger countries tend to intervene more
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often than small ones. Nevertheless, attributes of military great powers like availability of nuclear
weapons and number of soldiers do not affect the likelihood of intervention as theory predicts.
The actual degree of militarization of a society measured by the ratio of soldiers and population
may be relevant to the use of force by a state, but its preparations in armaments are more clearly.
This may hint at the special importance of military technology and quality of troops in military
operations short of full-scale war.
In brief, responding on the hypotheses presented above, this means:
a) Great powers tend to intervene more frequently in other countries than smaller states. The
status of a great power, however, is not necessarily defined by its actual military capabilities but
by its overall military potential including economic and demographic factors.
b) Democracies behave in the same way like other states. Democratization may therefore be no
sufficient way to promote international abstention from the use of military force.  
c) Military preparations indicate some willingness to use force not only in a purely defensive
manner but also for active implementation of foreign policy goals. However, the actual internal
militarization of a society in terms of expansion of the relative numbers of the armed forces
seems a less useful indicator for this attitude than military expenditure. Looking at the
quantitative strength of a country's army may even lead to conclusions contrary to its actual
intentions.  
d) A country's economic success does not guarantee to restrict its international behaviour to
non-military action. Wealth has no significant influence on the number of interventions,
indicating a trade-off between the basic risk-aversion of richer countries vis-à-vis losses by war,
and the need of modern economies to secure economic interests and resources abroad in order
to keep up their performance.  
These results obviously collide with the benchmark work by Bremer (1992) who concluded that,
basically, the implications of traditional idealist theory calling for democratization and economic
development in order to foster international peace were correct. One has to take into account,
however, that our approach aims at a far broader definition of international violence than his
analysis of interstate wars. Nevertheless, from a methodological point of view, it has been
demonstrated here that the Poisson model most frequently used in empirical international
relations may often be not the adequate way to deal with event count data. More sophisticated
models are at hand and should be used by applied researchers. 
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Table 1: Identified Interventions 1970-1989
Iran Iraq 1970
Syria Jordan 1970
USA Cambodia 1970
(North) Vietnam Cambodia 1970
USA North Vietnam 1970
India Bangladesh (East Pakistan) 1971
India Pakistan 1971
Zaire Burundi 1972
Egypt Israel 1973
Jordan Israel 1973
Syria Israel 1973
Iraq Israel 1973
Greece Cypres 1974
Turkey Cypres 1974
Indonesia Portugal (East Timor) 1975
Morocco Western Sahara 1975
Mauretania Western Sahara 1975
South Africa Angola 1975
Syria Lebanon 1976
Iraq Lebanon 1976
Algeria Morocco 1976
Cuba Angola 1976
Zimbabwe Angola 1976
Zimbabwe Botswana 1976
Zimbabwe Mozambique 1976
Zimababwe Zambia 1976
Vietnam Laos 1977
Morocco Zaire 1977
South Africa Mozambique 1977
South Africa Zambia 1977
Somalia Ethiopia (Ogaden) 1977
Cuba Ethiopia (Ogaden) 1977
France Mauretania 1977
Cuba Ethiopia (Eritrea) 1978
France Chad 1978
South Yemen North Yemen 1978
France Zaire 1978
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Belgium Zaire 1978
Libya Tanzania 1978
Uganda Tanzania 1978
Iraq Iran 1978
Vietnam Cambodia 1978
Israel Lebanon 1978
South Africa Angola 1978
USSR Afghanistan 1978
China Vietnam 1979
Syria Lebanon 1980
USA Iran 1980
Somalia Ethiopia 1980
Senegal Chad 1981
Zaire Chad 1981
Senegal The Gambia 1981
Israel Iraq 1981
South Africa Angola 1981
Argentina Great Britain 1982
Israel Lebanon 1982
Peru Ecuador 1982
USA Grenada 1983
Israel Tunisia 1983
Libya Chad 1983
France Chad 1983
Syria Lebanon 1985
USA Libya 1985
India Sri Lanka 1987
India Maledives 1988
China Vietnam (Spratlys) 1988
France Comores 1989
USA Panama 1989
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Table 2: Sample Means
Variable Total sample Interventionists Non-
Interventionists
Interventions 0.618 2.267 0
(1.29) (1.55)
Population 0.909 2.131 0.451
(2.70) (4.95) (0.57)
Military personnel 0.910 2.159 0.441
(2.30) (4.09) (0.60)
GNP 0.902 1.818 0.558
(2.97) (5.21) (1.32)
Nuclear power 0.064 0.200 0.013
(0.25) (0.41) (0.11)
Democracy 0.282 0.233 0.300
(0.45) (0.43) (0.46)
Defense budget (10 ) 5.556 9.214 4.184-1
(5.51) (7.22) (3.98)
Soldiers in population 7.546 11.127 6.203
(10 ) (7.32) (9.32) (5.95)-1
Wealth 1.141 0.989 1.199
(1.48) (1.30) (1.54)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3: One-Step Estimation Results
Variable Poisson GECk
Constant -1.185** -1.452**
(-4.67) (-3.65)
Population 0.135** 0.174**
(2.23) (2.75)
Military personnel -0.212** -0.157**
(-2.37) (-2.02)
GNP 0.132** 0.157**
(3.40) (3.62)
Nuclear power 1.407** -0.171
(2.09) (-0.28)
Democracy -0.671 0.080
(-1.18) (0.21)
Defense budget (10 ) 0.539** 0.066**-1
(2.13) (2.53)
Soldiers in population (10 ) 0.312 0.045**-1
(1.59) (2.35)
Wealth -0.136 -0.240
(-0.84) (-1.44)
² 1.207**
(2.71)
k -2.091
(-1.04)
lnL -106.61 -92.28
n 110 110
Endogenous variable: number of interventions 1970-1989, t-values in parentheses.
**: significant on the 95% level (two-tailed test)
*: significant on the 90% level (two-tailed test)
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Table 4: Results of the Hurdle Poisson Estimation
Variable First Step Second Step
Constant -2.213** 0.349
(-4.59) (0.89)
Population 0.457 0.081
(1.08) (1.06)
Military personnel -0.117 -0.228*
(-0.33) (-1.81)
GNP 0.048 0.082*
(0.32) (1.67)
Nuclear power 1.439 1.345
(1.17) (1.39)
Democracy 0.049 -0.783
(0.06) (-0.92)
Defense budget (10 ) 1.063** -0.063-1
(2.85) (-0.15)
Soldiers in population (10 ) 0.359 0.225-1
(1.03) (0.74)
Wealth -0.318 0.031
(-1.18) (0.13)
lnL -89.87
n 110
Endogenous variable: number of interventions 1970-1989,  t-values in parentheses.
**: significant on the 95% level (two-tailed test)
*: significant on the 90% level (two-tailed test)
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